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Your guide to what the 2024 US election means for Washington and the world
The writer is former chief of MI6 and UK ambassador to the UN
America’s friends and allies wait anxiously as the new Trump administration takes shape and its thinking on the world’s conflicts emerges. None more so than Britain, traditionally the US’s closest ally on defence and security.
There is opportunity amid the risk. On Ukraine, a new diplomatic initiative is badly needed to halt the carnage, preserve Ukraine as a nation and reduce the danger of Russian escalation beyond Ukraine’s borders. But what happens if, as is quite possible, the two parties cannot agree? Does Donald Trump simply walk the Americans away, taking their battlefield kit with them, and leave the mess to Europe to sort out?
The fact that Elon Musk recently met Iran’s ambassador to the UN suggests that both the Iranian leadership and the Trump team are toying with the idea of a deal to end Iran’s nuclear weapons activities, curb its support for militias outside Iran and ease sanctions. It sounds to me far-fetched and the Iranians are masters at stringing out such negotiations. But it is worth exploring.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may have different ambitions, hoping that the US will do what Israel cannot — use its air power to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities. The prospect could be attractive to Trump. But the idea of such a strike leaves our friends in the Gulf anxious and exposed and would be deeply divisive in Europe.
As for Asia, we know Trump will use punitive tariffs against China. But President Xi Jinping will be assessing the new administration’s approach on Taiwan. Trump’s aversion to war and his apparent lack of concern about preserving Taiwan’s democracy will leave Xi wondering whether the next four years are his opportunity to impose a blockade of the island and bring it back under Beijing’s control. The odds on a Taiwan crisis in the next four years have shortened.
America’s long-term allies in all three regions have a keen interest in how these issues play out, and we all recognise that a Trump administration will be less inclined than its predecessors to reflect our interests in its decisions. This poses a particular problem for Britain, as the UK’s two anchor points in the world — the US and Europe — have both become looser in the last decade.
Sir Keir Starmer, the prime minister, is fond of citing the “special relationship” with the US. It’s a term many practitioners like me try to avoid as it suggests neediness on our part. But there remains something unique in the ties between Britain and the US in the intelligence, nuclear and special forces fields. Operational detail is only briefed to a handful of cabinet ministers on each side who can be relied on to keep it secret.
Some of Trump’s nominees will present a challenge in this regard. I’m looking forward to the Senate intelligence committee’s confirmation hearings with Tulsi Gabbard, the president-elect’s nominee to be director of national intelligence. What exactly happened to trigger her Pauline conversion from left-leaning Democrat to admirer of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria and reliable mouthpiece for Vladimir Putin on the Ukraine invasion? Will the secrets that America’s allies share with US agencies be safe?
Will Pete Hegseth, if confirmed as defence secretary, bring the high-quality strategic leadership that the Pentagon badly needs to manage the technology revolution and keep America’s alliances together?
In terms of state-to-state relations, it will be easier for the Starmer government to strengthen security ties with European partners. Containing Russian aggression is the top concern of all the major countries of the EU, and Starmer and his ministers have invested in the personal relationships needed to agree a way forward. But in the defence and security field, we start from a lower base with Europe. There simply isn’t the depth of partnership even with France and Germany that we have in the Five Eyes network over intelligence and special forces. Nuclear co-operation with France has improved in the past 15 years, but it is still a pale shadow of the intertwining of the UK’s deterrent with America’s.
Being outside the EU makes all such co-operation harder. And any move by Starmer to sharply improve ties with Europe will also run into domestic sensitivities about undoing Brexit. Nato without committed American leadership isn’t an alternative as it won’t have the political heft of the EU.
The task of refreshing Britain’s relationships across both the Atlantic and the English Channel will fall to Starmer’s able new national security adviser, Jonathan Powell. Lord George Robertson’s defence review will hopefully provide a well-grounded policy framework. But there is a fresh reckoning to be had with hard-nosed realpolitik in global affairs — a brave new world where self-interest and strongmen are not dirty words. Trump’s chessboard is dominated by the US, China, Russia, India and Europe — powers to be contained, beaten and played off against each other in a zero-sum logic. The UK will need to find a distinctive role, drawing on areas of historic strength, to avoid becoming marginalised and exposed.
